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We examine the coexistence of banks and ﬁnancial markets, study-
ing a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not
observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not con-
tractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral-hazard problems by se-
curing a portion of a repayment in the case of non-investment. Finan-
cial markets operated by investment banks and rating agencies have
screening know-how and can alleviate adverse-selection problems. In
competition, standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since
ﬁnancial markets can attract the highest-quality borrowers. This, in
turn, increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unproﬁtable
for standard banks. The coexistence of ﬁnancial markets and standard
banks is socially ineﬃcient. The same ineﬃciency can happen with the
entrance of sophisticated banks, operating with a combination of rating
and ongoing monitoring technologies.1 Introduction
We consider a credit market in which creditors can neither observe the quality
of investment projects, nor whether entrepreneurs are investing and thus gen-
erating large enough returns to pay back their loans. Lenders therefore face
a combined adverse-selection and moral-hazard problem. We examine how
banks and ﬁnancial markets compete in this credit market. The ﬁrst type,
called the standard commercial bank (henceforth standard bank), can act as
a delegated monitor in the sense of the term used by Diamond (1984) and
can reduce the private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs who do not invest. Therefore
standard banks can alleviate moral hazard problems. Standard banks, how-
ever, face competition from ﬁnancial markets, whereas investment banks and
rating agencies are able to assess projects and at some cost can determine the
quality of investment projects. We examine whether it is socially desirable for
ﬁnancial markets and standard banks to be present simultaneously.
Moreover, the current banking regulation in Basel II forces banks to become
more sophisticated in the screening and rating of entrepreneurs. Hence we will
also investigate the consequences for welfare when sophisticated banks that
combine screening and monitoring technologies enter the scene.
Our conclusions are: First, if the pool of entrepreneurs is good enough,
standard banks competing with other standard banks only will oﬀer loans to
all entrepreneurs. Second, if only ﬁnancial markets are present and screening
costs are not too high, only borrowers with the best projects will obtain credit.
Third, in competition standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since
ﬁnancial markets can attract the highest quality borrowers. This, in turn,
increases the share of shirkers, which is socially ineﬃcient if social welfare is
measured by aggregate production. If standard banks and ﬁnancial markets
coexist, social eﬃciency is always lower compared to a situation where only
standard banks exist. Regulations prohibiting the coexistence of banks and
specialized lenders might be beneﬁcial.
1Fourth, if the attractiveness of the remaining pool of entrepreneurs for stan-
dard banks decreases too much when ﬁnancial markets are present, standard
banks will drop out of the market. Entrepreneurs with intermediate qualities
will not obtain loans, even if they have valuable projects. Since the presence of
ﬁnancial markets prevents intermediate-quality entrepreneurs from obtaining
loans due to the exit of standard banks, the presence of ﬁnancial markets can
again create social ineﬃciencies.
To sum up, the presence of ﬁnancial markets can create social ineﬃciencies,
since the share of shirkers may increase or intermediate borrowers may not be
able to obtain loans. Finally, we discuss the issue of whether sophisticated
banks with access to both types of monitoring technologies might obviate the
social ineﬃciencies created by ﬁnancial markets. Fostering the development of
such banks is one of the main objectives of Basel II. We show that, depending
on parameters, sophisticated banks either act as separate ﬁnancial markets
and standard banks, thus producing the same social ineﬃciencies, or they use
both monitoring technologies, which deﬁnitively improves welfare.
2 Motivation and Relation to the Literature
Our paper is related to diﬀerent strands in the literature. Its ﬁrst subject
is about competition between banks. Comprehensive surveys on bank com-
petition can be found in Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Hellwig (1994),
Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998), and Allen and Santomero (1998). We
branch out from this literature by considering the coexistence of ﬁnancial in-
termediaries with diﬀerent specializations in the presence of moral hazard and
adverse selection.1 We show that the interaction of adverse selection and moral
1The coexistence of ﬁnancial institutions is an issue in other contexts. E.g., Black and
Gilson (1998) provide a comprehensive account of the role of venture capitalists in ﬁnancial
markets. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1998) and Berger (2000) provide comprehensive
analysis of the forces and barriers related to the integration of the ﬁnancial service industry.
2hazard creates social ineﬃciencies in credit markets when standard banks com-
pete with ﬁnancial markets or sophisticated banks.
Second, Boot and Thakor (2000) examine whether relationship banking
that involves unique bank-speciﬁc services can survive competition from trans-
action lending. They show that a bank’s optimal response to increased compe-
tition is to expand its relationship lending relative to its transaction lending.
Therefore the argument that relationship lending will be driven out of the
market by competition with transaction lending is premature. Boot (2000)
provides a comprehensive survey of the issues. Our work is complementary,
since we focus on another possible type of specialization with regard to the
handling of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Third, a wealth of research has addressed and enlarged upon the co-existence
of bank lending and bond ﬁnancing: Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Boot and
Thakor (1997a), Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1997), von Thadden (1999), Repullo
and Suarez (2000), Bolton and Freixas (2000), and Allen and Gale (2004). Our
main contribution to this literature is to examine the coexistence of banks and
ﬁnancial markets when the pool of borrowers is plagued simultaneously by
moral hazard and adverse selection.
Fourth, another important source of literature has been the coexistence of
commercial banking and underwriting securities studied in Kroszner and Ra-
jan (1994), Puri (1994, 1999), Boot and Thakor (1997b), and more recently by
Kanatas and Qi (1998) and (2000). This literature identiﬁes the circumstances
under which the combination of commercial lending and underwriting securi-
ties within sophisticated banks reduces their incentives (relative to those of
specialized intermediaries) to undertake ﬁnancial innovation aimed at helping
to sell their client’s securities. There may however be informational economies
of scope between the banking activities. Our paper is complementary to this
literature. Although in our model a sophisticated bank can simultaneously
alleviate moral-hazard and adverse-selection problems, it might simply behave
3like investment banks so as to emulate ﬁnancial markets. Our analysis also
highlights the cost levels of screening and interim monitoring at which the
integration of ﬁnancial services takes place.
We interpret standard banks as commercial banks. Such banks acquire
knowledge of how to inspect the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow when customers pay, or they
collateralize assets if they are created in the process of investing or selling
products.2 In ﬁnancial markets, investment banks and rating agencies special-
ize in screening entrepreneurs with creditworthiness tests. Investment banks
and rating agencies do not engage in the continuous monitoring of investment
behavior. Thus ﬁnancial markets with investment banks and rating agencies
can mainly alleviate adverse-selection problems.3 Accordingly, our analysis
points up the potential negative feedback eﬀects from banking regulation in
the form of the new Accord Basel II that aims at increasing the sophistication
of banks with respect to their screening and rating capabilities. As our model
indicates, such attempts at banking regulation may not produce welfare gains
if sophisticated banks tend to specialize in investment banking and threaten
the economic role of standard commercial banks. Even if standard banks can
survive, the proportion of shirkers in the economy will increase.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we outline the model.
Then we separately examine standard banks in section 4 and ﬁnancial markets
in section 5. In section 6, the coexistence of standard banks and ﬁnancial
markets is discussed. In section 7 we examine sophisticated banks. Section 8
concludes.
2See James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) for evidence that private infor-
mation about their borrowers is generated by commercial banks during lending.
3The informational role of underwriters is shown, for example, in Beatty and Ritter
(1986), Booth and Smith (1986), and Carter and Manaster (1990). It is clear that commercial
banks also invest resources in screening potential borrowers. Accordingly, when we examine
sophisticated banks we take account of their screening role as well.
43 Model
There are two periods, this period and the next period . We consider a ﬁnite
number k of entrepreneurs who have access to a project but do not have
the funds to ﬁnance it. Entrepreneurs are of diﬀerent types j = 1,...,n.
Entrepreneurs of type j have a quality of qj ≥ 0. The probability that an
entrepreneur is of type qj is denoted by γj. To simplify notation we present
our results normalized by the number of entrepreneurs, i.e. we set k = 1.4
Qualities are labeled so that 0 ≤ q1 < q2 < ··· < qn, i.e. qualities qj are
strictly increasing in j. All projects are of equal size. Suppose that the initial
costs for each project are I +z, but the entrepreneur’s initial wealth is only z.
Hence, an entrepreneur must borrow at least I for the project.
Given additional resources I > 0, he can choose to invest (δj = 1) or not
(δj = 0). If he invests in this period, he receives the output
(I + z) · qj
in the next period. If the entrepreneur does not invest, the available funds are
simply I + z. Entrepreneurs cannot have negative wealth in the next period.
Entrepreneurs can borrow additional funds from standard banks or from
ﬁnancial markets operated by investment banks. Lenders face the following
informational asymmetries if they decide not to invest in monitoring: The
quality qj is known to the entrepreneur but not to lenders. Moreover, lenders
cannot observe a priori whether or not an entrepreneur invests. Thus creditors
face a ﬁxed pool of seemingly identical borrowers. Lenders, however, can only
observe and verify realized cash ﬂows in the next period if the entrepreneur
invests. If the entrepreneur does not invest but simply consumes the funds
granted to him, lenders cannot expect any repayment.
It is useful to discuss the main assumptions of our model. The non-
veriﬁability of the investment decision is a standard scenario. Projects often
4To represent our results in absolute terms, all expressions for proﬁts and welfare must
be multiplied by k.
5require speciﬁc human capital, or they may need the design of blueprints for
machinery, buildings, or logistics. In the case of an inventor, the person in
question may spend a lot of time reading and designing. Whether these ef-
forts are directed toward the project and whether blueprints are competently
drafted is unlikely to be observable for a standard bank. Even if it becomes
clear to the standard bank ex post whether or not the entrepreneur has in-
vested, investment decisions are not veriﬁable in court.
The second assumption of our model is that the veriﬁcation of output con-
ditional on investment is possible at low or zero costs, while entrepreneurs
have large private beneﬁts if they do not invest. The assumption is justiﬁed
by the possibilities available to standard banks of securing the repayments
if entrepreneurs invest. Monitoring to secure repayments takes many forms:
inspection of ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow when customers pay, and eﬀorts to collateralize
assets if they have been created in the process of investing and selling products
to customers. If the ﬁnal products of an entrepreneur’s project are physical
goods, such as houses or machines, standard banks can secure repayment con-
ditional on investment at very low costs. For simplicity, we assume that the
costs of verifying cash ﬂow are zero if the entrepreneur has invested. For the
same reason, we assume that the repayment will be zero if entrepreneurs do
not invest but simply consume the funds, as long as lenders do not invest
in monitoring. Our assumption—non-veriﬁability of investments, but veriﬁ-
ability of project output—is a simple way of modeling moral hazard. Two
remarks about our modeling approach are in order. One could introduce an
arbitrarily small probability ε(ε > 0) such that investment returns are 0 with
probability ε and qj(I + z) with probability 1 − ε. This would strengthen the
non-veriﬁability of investment assumptions.5 Second, as documented in the
empirical banking literature, monitoring activities to ensure promised invest-
5Since entrepreneurs can consume their funds when they do not invest, there is no way
for banks to punish non-investing entrepreneurs because they can always claim that their
investments were unsuccessful.
6ment activities by borrowers and to prevent funds from being diverted is an
important aspect of the activities of commercial banks (see e.g. James (1987),
Lummer and McConell (1989), Petersen (2004), Berger and Udell (2002)).
Standard banks and ﬁnancial markets specialize in certain monitoring tech-
nologies. Standard commercial banks act as delegated monitors and alleviate
the moral-hazard problem to some extent by securing non-zero repayment if
entrepreneurs do not invest.
Investment banks and rating agencies operating in ﬁnancial markets spe-
cialize in alleviating adverse-selection problems. They can screen entrepreneurs
by creditworthiness tests (see Br¨ ocker (1990)) and then decide whether or not
to issue debt on behalf of entrepreneurs. In contrast to standard banks, invest-
ment banks in ﬁnancial markets only interact with entrepreneurs at the stage
when debt contracts are issued and do not engage in continuous monitoring of
investment behavior.
Crucial for our analysis is the fact that agents in ﬁnancial markets may
tend to specialize in alleviating moral-hazard or adverse-selection problems.
For instance, a rating agency or an investment bank acquires knowledge about
industries in which borrowers are engaged and can therefore perform reliable
creditworthiness tests. Other ﬁnancial institutions, such as commercial banks,
acquire knowledge of how to inspect the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow when customers pay, or
they invest in eﬀorts to collateralize assets if they are created in the process of
investing or selling products. The exact nature of these diﬀerent specializations
by ﬁnancial institutions will be discussed in the following sections.
There are potentially H standard banks indexed by i or h with i,h =
1,...,H that can enter the credit market, and ﬁnancial markets are operated
by investment banks. Standard banks and investors in capital markets are
assumed to be risk-neutral. For simplicity of presentation, the opportunity
cost of funds is normalized to zero. We summarize the game as follows:
71. Standard banks and investment banks operating ﬁnancial markets simul-
taneously decide whether or not to enter and which contract to oﬀer to
investors upon entering.
2. Entrepreneurs simultaneously choose standard banks or choose to borrow
from ﬁnancial markets via investment banks.
3. Banks ﬁnance themselves at the opportunity cost of funds. Funded en-
trepreneurs make a decision on whether to invest.
4. Payoﬀs are realized and repayments occur.
An equilibrium of this game is a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. It is a self–selection model where standard sorting devices,
such as collateral (see Bester (1985), Bester (1987)), cannot be used to separate
bad entrepreneurs from good ones.6
We additionally assume four tie–breakers in the case of indiﬀerence on the
part of the entrepreneurs. We describe them brieﬂy here and in greater de-
tail in the analysis below. First, entrepreneurs who are indiﬀerent between
investing and not investing always choose to invest. Second, investing en-
trepreneurs who are indiﬀerent between several standard banks or between
several contracts issued by investment banks on behalf of entrepreneurs will
choose between standard banks or investment banks with equal probability.
Third, entrepreneurs who are indiﬀerent between standard banks and ﬁnan-
cial markets will go to ﬁnancial markets. Fourth, entrepreneurs who choose
not to invest will randomize across their preferred standard banks in order
to mimic the investing entrepreneurs.7 The ﬁrst three tie–breaker rules are
6Such models have been introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). Hellwig (1987) provides a detailed discussion of the existence problems in
such models.
7Since investment banks operating ﬁnancial markets can screen projects, they will be
able to avoid and reject shirkers applying for credit contracts.
8standard and innocuous, while the fourth tie–breaker rule is critical to the
analysis and will be discussed in more detail when we examine competition in
the credit market.
We conclude the description of the game by deriving the ﬁrst-best allo-
cation. For that purpose, we assume that there is a ﬁxed pool of savings,
denoted by S. We assume that savings exceed the volume of loans if all en-
trepreneurs have obtained a credit. Since we have normalized the number of
entrepreneurs, k, to 1, the condition amounts to S > I.8 All savings not chan-
neled to entrepreneurs are assumed to be invested in a frictionless technology
that generates the opportunity costs of funds. Then welfare is deﬁned as the
value of aggregate resources in stage 4. Let j∗ = min{j | qj ≥ 1}. Hence j∗ is
the ﬁrst index value for which the return of the investment project is greater
than, or equal to, the opportunity costs of funds. The ﬁrst-best solution is
characterized by the absence of informational functions and by a social plan-
ner granting loans and enforcing investment decisions in order to maximize
aggregate output.
Proposition 1 The ﬁrst-best solution is characterized as follows: An en-
trepreneur obtains a loan and has to invest if, and only if, qj ≥ 1, i.e., iﬀ
j ≥ j∗.
In other words, the social planner dictates that there should be investment
in all those projects that at least meet the opportunity costs. The proposition






















The ﬁrst term in W FB represents the output of entrepreneurs who have
8Note that banks are assumed to have unlimited access to funds at a zero interest rate.
As credit decisions are taken before banks ﬁnance themselves, the condition S > I ensures
that no bank will be rationed by deposits.
9received loans and have invested. The last two terms capture the output from
investing the remaining funds in the frictionless technology.
4 Standard Banks Only
In this section we study competition between standard banks. We assume
that these banks oﬀer debt contracts. A theoretical justiﬁcation is given in
Gersbach and Uhlig (2004), which can easily be extended to standard banks
with monitoring technologies, such as those considered in this paper.
A debt contract oﬀered by bank i (i = 1,...,H), denoted by D(Ri), is
characterized by a repayment Ri that is independent of the type j. Moreover,
under a debt contract the standard bank i obtains qj(I+z) if the entrepreneur
has invested but cannot pay back Ri since control will shift to the creditor.
Standard banks are assumed to have access to a monitoring technology. If a
bank oﬀers a loan contract to an entrepreneur and pays a resource cost m,m ≥
0, it can secure a repayment of αI (0 < α ≤ 1) from the entrepreneur if he
does not invest. Hence, a non-investing entrepreneur only obtains z+(1−α)I.
If the entrepreneur invests, the bank obtains min{Ri,qj(I+z)}. Note that the
resource cost m has to be paid before the bank observes shirking on the part
of entrepreneurs. We assume throughout the paper that m is small enough
for standard banks always to decide to monitor when they grant loans. A
necessary condition is m < αI.9
Consider an entrepreneur of type j. If there is at least one contract for
which investing is weakly better than not investing, we assume that the en-
trepreneur will always choose to invest (this is the ﬁrst tie–breaker mentioned
above) and will select any of the standard banks at which the payoﬀ is maxi-
mized with equal probability (this is the second tie–breaker mentioned above).
9If we use F(q) to denote the proportion of entrepreneurs with qj > q, a suﬃcient
condition is m < αIF(1), since the proportion of shirkers standard banks face is at least
F(1).
10All entrepreneurs for whom not investing is strictly better than investing
are shirkers and will not invest. Shirkers will choose the standard bank oﬀering
the highest payoﬀ. Hence they prefer standard banks that do not monitor to
standard banks that invest in monitoring. They are indiﬀerent among the
set of standard banks if, as we have assumed, all standard banks invest in
monitoring.
To break that indiﬀerence we employ our fourth tie–breaker rule. We as-
sume that shirkers distribute themselves across the standard banks in exactly
the same way as investors do. A justiﬁcation for this assumption is given in
Gersbach and Uhlig (2004).10
Bertrand competition will ensure that in any equilibrium standard banks
will demand the same repayment, which is denoted by Rb. The entrepreneur
who is indiﬀerent between investing and not-investing when applying for a
standard bank credit is denoted by qSB and given by
q
SB(I + z) − R
b = (1 − α) · I + z
q
SB = 1 + Rb−αI
I+z
Note that qSB increases with the repayment because a higher repayment will
increase the incentive to shirk. The expected proﬁts for standard banks are










b − I − m) (1)
Let R∗ be the interest rate standard banks will charge under Bertrand




10If all entrepreneurs are shirkers, we assume that shirkers distribute themselves arbitrarily
across standard banks. Since this case does not occur in equilibrium or in any relevant
deviation strategies, the assumption is harmless.
11Equation 1 implies that R∗ exists if the pool of investors is of suﬃciently
high quality and/or the monitoring technology in terms of the pair (α,m) is
suﬃciently eﬀective, i.e. if α is suﬃciently high and m comparatively low. We
summarize our observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that R∗ exists and that only standard banks are present.
Then there exists a unique equilibrium in which standard banks oﬀer debt con-
tracts at repayment R∗.
In the following we assume that R∗ exists. Otherwise, there would be no
economic role for standard banks.
5 Financial Markets Only
In this section we assume that there is a ﬁnite number of investment banks that
operate ﬁnancial markets. An investment bank has access to a creditworthiness
test. If an investment bank invests c > 0 per credit, it can detect the quality
of the project when the entrepreneur applies for a debt contract and has the
option of issuing debt on behalf of the entrepreneur. We interpret c as the
overall cost of a creditworthiness test and placement and settlement of one
debt contract. Diﬀerent levels of c may be associated with diﬀerent levels of
ﬁnancial development. A high level of c corresponds to ﬁnancial institutions
where direct ﬁnancing operated by investment banks is less highly developed.
There are two options for investment banks entering into an agreement with
a borrower. First, they can decide to undertake a creditworthiness test and
then decide whether to issue debt contracts on behalf of the entrepreneurs
by pledging the entrepreneurs’ capacity to pay back consumers. Second, they
can issue debt contracts themselves and then decide whether to undertake a
creditworthiness test and to oﬀer debt contracts to a borrower. We work here
with the ﬁrst variant because it is closer to the actual behavior of ﬁnancial
markets.
12We assume that investment banks either perform a creditworthiness test
before issuing debt on behalf of investors, or they do not enter the market.11
Obviously, an investment bank will only issue debt on behalf of investors if
the project is of suﬃciently high quality. Let qFM denote the critical quality
level above which entrepreneurs receive credit. A credit contract oﬀered by
an investment bank on behalf of investors is denoted by Cv(Rv
qj,qj ≥ qFM).
Rv
qj is the repayment demanded from an entrepreneur that turns out to be of
quality qj ≥ qFM when screened by an investment bank. The expected proﬁt
of a bank from a loan to an entrepreneur with quality level qj who invests is
given by Gv
qj = Rv
qj − I − c.
We assume that the entrepreneur is charged with the costs of the credit-
worthiness test up front, which he must then pay for from his initial wealth z.
If the test turns out to be positive, i.e. q ≥ qFM, the investment bank grants
a credit of I + c. If the test yields q < qFM, the entrepreneur bears the cost.
The assumption allows investment banks to deter entrepreneurs of lower
quality than qFM from applying for credit. Otherwise, investment banks would
need to be concerned about the incentives of entrepreneurs with q < qFM for
applying for creditworthiness tests. Once an investment bank performs the
test, pays c, and discovers that q < qFM, the entrepreneur could negotiate a
lower repayment with the investment bank because c is sunk. We obtain
Proposition 3 Suppose that only ﬁnancial markets operated by investment
banks are present. Then there exists a unique equilibrium with
R
v
qj = Rv∗ = I + c
q
FM∗ = 1 + I+c
I+z
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix. Proposition 3 shows
that only entrepreneurs with q ≥ qFM∗ will have access to ﬁnancial markets.
Financial markets avoid shirkers but limit access to the market.
11The screening condition requires that the screening costs c be below some critical level
that can be determined by using the next propositions.
136 Standard Banks and Financial Markets
In this section we examine the coexistence of standard banks and ﬁnancial
markets. Because of the Bertrand competition between standard banks, we
simplify the derivation by assuming that all standard banks oﬀer the same
interest rate, denoted by Rb. Obviously, we have to show that in the proposed
equilibria no standard bank wants to deviate.
To determine the equilibria we proceed in two steps. First, we determine
the proﬁts of standard banks under the assumption that repayments to the said
banks will always be higher than in ﬁnancial markets. Hence all entrepreneurs
contemplating investment would like to obtain credit from ﬁnancial markets.
Standard banks thus anticipate that they will not attract entrepreneurs above a
certain quality level, denoted by ¯ q. In the second step, we will discuss whether
this is indeed an equilibrium.
The expected proﬁts for standard banks, depending on the quality level ¯ q,










b − I − m) (2)
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Obviously Rb∗(¯ q) may not exist. In general, Rb∗(q) exists if the pool of investors
below q is of suﬃciently high quality and the monitoring technology in terms






Lemma 1 Suppose that Rb∗(¯ q1) exists for some ¯ q1 < qn. Then Rb∗(¯ q) exists
for all ¯ q ∈ [¯ q1,qn] and is monotonically decreasing in ¯ q.12
12Note that Rb∗(¯ q) is a step function.
14The proof of Lemma 1 follows directly from equation (2). The preced-
ing analysis allows us to establish equilibria when both standard banks and
investment banks operating in ﬁnancial markets compete for borrowers.
Proposition 4 Suppose that R∗ exists.
(i) If R∗ < I + c, there exists a unique equilibrium in which only standard
banks are active and oﬀer debt contracts at a repayment rate of R∗.
(ii) If R∗ ≥ I + c, investment banks will oﬀer debt contracts on behalf of
entrepreneurs at a repayment rate of Rv∗ = I + c for all entrepreneurs
with
qj ≥ q
FM∗ = 1 +
I + c
I + z





v∗ = I + c
and attract all entrepreneurs with qj < qFM∗.
b) If Rb∗(qFM∗) does not exist, standard banks do not oﬀer any con-
tracts, and only entrepreneurs with qj ≥ qFM∗ receive credit con-
tracts.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. The second part of
Proposition 4 shows how ﬁnancial markets and standard banks might coexist.
Only entrepreneurs with qj ≥ qFM∗ are able to access ﬁnancial markets. En-
trepreneurs with qj < qFM∗ face higher repayments but have no other choice
than to go to standard banks. As such entrepreneurs will be monitored by
standard banks, some of them are willing to invest upon receiving a loan. If
monitoring technology in terms of the pair (α,m) is suﬃciently eﬀective and
the pool of entrepreneurs with 0 ≤ qj ≤ qFM∗ is suﬃciently attractive, then
Rb∗(qFM∗) exists and standard banks and ﬁnancial markets coexist.
15It is important to stress that the coexistence of standard banks and ﬁnancial
markets does not depend on the cost of monitoring m for standard banks being
much smaller than the cost of a creditworthiness test. Suppose, for instance,














Now it is possible for Rb∗(qFM∗) to exist even if m ≥ c. For instance, if
m = c and the share of entrepreneurs in [1+ 2c
I+z,1+ I+c
I+z] is at least 1
2, we have
Gb(qFM∗,I + 2c) ≥ 0, and hence Rb∗ exists.
Proposition 4 also implies that the presence of investment banks operating
in ﬁnancial markets can lead to a breakdown of ﬁnancing for the remaining
borrowers. This occurs if standard banks face an unattractive pool of en-
trepreneurs in [q1,qFM∗] and monitoring technologies in terms of (m,α) are
not highly eﬀective.
To determine the social eﬃciency of the presence of ﬁnancial markets, we
recall that savings not channeled to entrepreneurs are invested at the oppor-
tunity costs of funds. We denote the welfare in the three diﬀerent cases by
W SB,W SB,FM, and W FM, respectively. We then obtain
Proposition 5














γj(I + z) + (S − I − m)
16(ii) If R∗ ≥ I + c














































The ﬁrst term in W FM is the value of production from investing en-
trepreneurs. The last two terms represent the investment of the remaining
funds in the frictionless technology and the consumption of the entrepreneurs.
The preceding proposition immediately allows us to characterize the constel-
lations in which the joint presence of ﬁnancial markets and standard banks
is socially ineﬃcient. For our main result, we assume for the moment that
monitoring and screening costs are suﬃciently low and can be disregarded.
Proposition 6 Suppose that initially only standard banks are present. Then
the entrance of investment banks operating ﬁnancial markets is socially ineﬃ-
cient if, and only if,
(i) – entrepreneurs of high quality beneﬁt from and obtain ﬁnancing through
capital markets (R∗ ≥ I + c) and
– standard banks make non-negative proﬁts with the pool of entrepreneurs
who do not have access to capital markets (Rb∗(qFM∗) exists)
or
17(ii) – entrepreneurs of high quality beneﬁt from and obtain ﬁnancing through
capital markets (R∗ ≥ I + c),
– standard banks cannot make non-negative proﬁts with the remaining
pool of entrepreneurs who do not have access to capital markets and
drop out (Rb∗(qFM∗) does not exist), and
– entrepreneurs of higher quality than those investing with standard
banks alone obtain capital market ﬁnancing (R∗ − αI < I + c).
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the appendix. We observe that the
presence of investment banks operating ﬁnancial markets is socially ineﬃcient
in two cases. In particular, if standard banks and ﬁnancial markets coexist,
the outcome is necessarily socially ineﬃcient.13
The presence of ﬁnancial markets is irrelevant if screening costs are suﬃ-
ciently high and socially eﬃcient if screening costs are suﬃciently low, such that
standard banks drop out of the market and more intermediate quality borrow-
ers will obtain credit than with standard banks alone, i.e. if qFM∗ < qSB(R∗).
In Proposition 6, we have neglected monitoring and screening costs. We
now discuss how our results need to be modiﬁed in the presence of such costs.
Clearly, the ﬁrst point in Proposition 6 holds under the stated assumptions if
m ≤ c, since the presence of ﬁnancial markets would increase resource costs for
banking activities. The second part holds as long as investment gains under
standard banks outweigh the potential savings of screening costs when only
investment banks operating in ﬁnancial markets are present.14
The last two propositions illustrate that there is a non-monotonical re-
lationship between the eﬃciency of the monitoring technology of investment
banks operating in ﬁnancial markets and social welfare. Suppose that for in-
vestment banks the cost c of judging investment projects is suﬃciently high, so
13If the opportunity cost of funds is positive, we obtain a countervailing eﬀect since shirkers
no longer generate the opportunity cost of funds. However, the presence of ﬁnancial markets
is still ineﬃcient if the share of intermediate quality borrowers is suﬃciently large.
14Savings of screening costs occur if c < m or c > m and m > c
P
qj≥qFM∗ γj.
18that R∗ < I+c. Standard banks will then oﬀer credit to all entrepreneurs. If c
declines to a level that permits the coexistence of standard banks and ﬁnancial
markets or drives standard banks out of the market, the resulting allocation
is less eﬃcient. If, however, c shrinks even more, investment banks will reduce
repayments to entrepreneurs for whom they issue debt contracts, thus allowing
more entrepreneurs to obtain credit, which is socially more beneﬁcial.
There have been many debates about the historical absence in continental
Europe of certain types of ﬁnancial intermediaries, such as venture capitalists
or highly developed markets for investment banks. This is often ascribed to
regulations rather than to a lack of entrepreneurial spirit. One interpretation
in the light of the arguments set out above is that such a situation may protect
standard banks. If ﬁnancial markets were to develop for the same borrower
classes, it could destroy existing credit markets. Clearly, other arguments need
to be added in order to obtain a balanced perspective on such policy issues.
However, our theoretical predictions show that the introduction of banks spe-
cializing in creditworthiness tests may hamper the functioning of credit mar-
kets, even if the available monitoring technologies of ﬁnancial intermediaries
improve.
7 Sophisticated Banks
Finally, let us consider a sophisticated ﬁnancial intermediary that has access
to both types of monitoring technologies. The development of such banks is
the objective of the new framework for banking regulation known as Basel II.
Consider a situation where initially only standard banks are present. How
sophisticated banks behave in competition with standard banks depends cru-
cially on parameter comparisons. Let us consider this in more detail.
Suppose sophisticated banks can use both monitoring technologies. Bertrand
competition ensures that repayments are I +c+m. A sophisticated bank will
be able to ﬁnance all entrepreneurs of a quality above a critical level, denoted
19by qsoph, and given by
q
soph(I + z) − (I + c + m) = (1 − α) · I + z
q
soph = 1 + I+c+m−αI
I+z
Hence a sophisticated bank can oﬀer credit contracts such that all en-
trepreneurs who turn out to have a quality above qsoph in the creditworthiness
test will obtain loans. Bertrand competition ensures that the repayment so-
phisticated banks oﬀer to such entrepreneurs is equal to I + c + m.
We now characterize the equilibrium behavior of sophisticated banks. Since
sophisticated banks can behave as investment banks, standard banks, or gen-
uinely sophisticated banks, we can directly formulate the coexistence result in
the following Proposition, which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 7 Suppose that R∗ exists
(i) If R∗ < I + c, only standard banks and sophisticated banks acting as
standard banks are active and oﬀer debt contracts at R∗.
(ii) If R∗ ≥ I + c, investment banks and sophisticated banks acting as invest-
ment banks oﬀer debt contracts at Rv∗ = I +c for all entrepreneurs with
qj ≥ qFM∗
a.) If Rb∗(qFM∗) exists and if Rb∗(qFM∗) < I + c + m,
standard banks and sophisticated banks behaving as standard banks
oﬀer debt contracts at Rb∗(qFM∗)
b.) If Rb∗(qFM∗) does not exist or if Rb∗(qFM∗) ≥ I + c + m,
sophisticated banks oﬀer debt contracts at repayment
Rsoph∗ = I + c + m for entrepreneurs with qsoph ≤ qj < qFM∗
Standard banks are not active.
20The preceding proposition shows that standard banks and sophisticated
banks can never coexist. If R∗ ≥ I + c, sophisticated banks may act as in-
vestment banks operating ﬁnancial markets and as standard banks for the
remaining entrepreneurs. Hence in this case they would produce the same so-
cial ineﬃciencies as discussed in the previous section. Alternatively, they apply
both types of monitoring technologies, which may be socially eﬃcient.15 The
former case indicates that regulation such as Basel II, aimed at increasing the
sophistication of banks, may lead to welfare losses if monitoring technologies
are not eﬃcient enough.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have identiﬁed a potential problem when capital markets
operated by investment banks and standard commercial banks compete. If
standard banks face competition from ﬁnancial markets in which investment
banks perform creditworthiness tests, welfare may decrease. Since ﬁnancial
markets can attract the highest quality borrowers, standard banks are forced
to increase repayments. This, in turn, leads to less productive investments.
We have outlined potential applications of the coexistence problem of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries and ﬁnancial markets when regulations aim to increase the
sophistication of ﬁnancial institutions.
15The condition is qSB(R∗) > qsoph.
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Proof of Proposition 3
It is obvious that Bertrand competition ensures Rqj = I + c for all investing
entrepreneurs if the investment is riskless. Repayments in this case must cover
the opportunity cost of funds and the resources needed to perform creditwor-
thiness tests. Given the repayment Rv∗ = I+c, the lowest quality entrepreneur
who still invests is determined by qFM∗(I + z) − Rv∗ = I + z, which implies
qFM∗ = 1 + I+c
I+z. Hence, for q ≥ qFM∗ the investment is indeed riskless.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) The ﬁrst point follows directly, since ﬁnancial markets could not attract
any entrepreneurs. In turn, if investment banks oﬀer Rv∗ = I+c in ﬁnan-
cial markets, standard banks can successfully undercut them in terms of
repayments and attract all investors.
(ii) If R∗ ≥ I+c, competition between investment banks in ﬁnancial markets
requires that Rv∗ = I + c. Since Rb∗(qn) = R∗ > Rv∗ and Rb∗ is mono-
tonically decreasing in q, standard banks can never successfully undercut
investment banks operating in ﬁnancial markets. Hence all entrepreneurs
with qj ≥ qFM∗ will be attracted by ﬁnancial markets. Standard banks
will enter and oﬀer credit contracts to the remaining population of en-
trepreneurs if, and only if, they can make non-negative proﬁts and hence
if, and only if, Rb∗(qFM∗) exists. This implies (ii)a and (ii)b. If Rb∗(qFM∗)
exists, the competition of standard banks will induce each standard bank
to charge Rb∗(qFM∗) in equilibrium, as discussed earlier in the paper.
22Proof of Proposition 6
There are two cases where the entrance of investment banks operating ﬁnancial
markets is socially ineﬃcient. The ﬁrst case is characterized as follows:
• high-quality entrepreneurs beneﬁt from, and obtain ﬁnancing through,
capital markets (R∗ ≥ I + c), and
• standard banks can make positive or zero proﬁts with the pool of en-
trepreneurs who do not have access to capital markets. The relevant
condition is that Rb∗(qFM∗) exists.
Since standard banks need to oﬀer higher repayments to the remaining pool
of borrowers (Rb∗(qFM∗) > R∗), entrepreneurs using standard banks have less
incentive to invest. As high-quality entrepreneurs lured away by investment
banks would have also invested if standard banks were present on their own,
the entrance of investment banks decreases the overall share of investing en-
trepreneurs and is therefore ineﬃcient. This proves the ﬁrst case. The second
case is characterized as follows:
• high-quality entrepreneurs with high quality beneﬁt from, and obtain
ﬁnancing through, capital markets (R∗ ≥ I + c),
• standard banks cannot make non-negative proﬁts with the remaining
pool of entrepreneurs and drop out (Rb∗(qFM∗) does not exist), and
• only entrepreneurs of higher quality than those investing with the stan-
dard bank alone obtain ﬁnancing through capital markets. The relevant
condition is qSB(R∗) < qFM∗, which translates into R∗ − αI < I + c.
In the second case, ﬁnancial markets cause the exit of standard banks. As
only high-quality entrepreneurs have access to ﬁnancial markets, the share of
investing entrepreneurs decreases, as intermediate entrepreneurs who would
invest with standard banks alone do not have access to credit.
23Proof of Proposition 7
The ﬁrst point (i) is clear. For (ii) we observe that sophisticated banks have no
incentive to monitor entrepreneurs with qj ≥ qFM∗, as standard banks do, as
such entrepreneurs will invest anyway. Hence for such entrepreneurs, sophisti-
cated banks imitate investment banks and require a repayment of Ro∗ = I +c.
Next, we note that our general assumption αI > m implies that qsoph < qFM∗.
Hence for the range of quality levels [qsoph,qFM∗) sophisticated banks apply
both monitoring technologies to an individual entrepreneur, as otherwise such
entrepreneurs would shirk. If, however, Rb∗(qFM∗) < I+c+m, standard banks
that perform no creditworthiness test can oﬀer better terms for the whole pool
of entrepreneurs. Therefore sophisticated banks imitate standard banks for
the pool of investors who do not apply for creditworthiness tests.
If Rb∗(qFM∗) does not exist, standard banks are not active, and sophisti-
cated banks oﬀer a second type of debt contract to entrepreneurs with qsoph ≤
qj < qFM∗ at repayment Rsoph∗ = I + c + m. Such entrepreneurs are screened
and monitored to avoid shirking. Sophisticated banks act like truly sophisti-
cated banks.
Finally, we discuss the case where Rb∗(qFM∗) exists and is larger than












Hence standard banks would only have shirkers in the remaining pool of en-
trepreneurs [q1,qsoph] and accordingly drop out of the market.
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